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I.  INTRODUCTION 
–“No language, no nation.” 
Welsh proverb1 
 
Defining a nation by its language is as old as Western civilization.2  For 
the ancient Greeks, speaking Greek was the only definitive factor to being 
Greek.3  In writing for his badly fragmented country,4 the German 
philosopher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, placed language at the heart of 
nationhood.  “[N]atural frontiers of states,” Fichte observed, are determined 
foremost by their “inner frontiers,” or, more specifically, language.5  “Those 
who speak the same language,” Fichte argued, “are already . . . joined 
together by mere nature with a multitude of invisible ties . . . they belong 
together and are naturally one, an indivisible whole.”6  Out of a distinct 
language, a distinct state is born.7  It is no surprise that linguistic unity 
remains a common basis of nation-building and national unity.8  However, if 
language plays so great a role as the germ of a nation, then with over 6,000 
living languages,9 the international political landscape is rife with potential 
nation candidates. 
The disproportion between the number of extant languages and nations 
reveals a telling linguistic phenomenon: languages, like nations, war with 
one another for dominance and, in the process, result in language death.10  
Currently, 90% of the world’s population uses the 100 most-used 
languages.11  Based on this statistic of language demand, it is not surprising 
that, of the total number of existing languages, more than half will fall into 
disuse and become extinct in the twenty-first century.12  
                                                                                                                   
 1 DANIEL NETTLE & SUZANNE ROMAINE, VANISHING VOICES: THE EXTINCTION OF THE 
WORLD’S LANGUAGES 23 (2000). 
 2 ANDREW DALBY, LANGUAGE IN DANGER 128 (2003). 
 3 Id.  
 4 By 1808, forty-one separate territories made up “Germany.”  J.G. FICHTE, ADDRESSES TO 
THE GERMAN NATION, at xii (Gregory Moore ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (1808). 
 5 Id. at 166. 
 6 Id. 
 7 DALBY, supra note 2, at 129 (speaking of Fichte’s philosophy of language and state 
creation). 
 8 See CLAUDE HAGÈGE, ON THE DEATH AND LIFE OF LANGUAGES 118 (Jody Gladding trans., 
2009) (noting that France’s policy of marginalizing regional languages to enhance national 
unity “is hardly an isolated case”). 
 9 NETTLE & ROMAINE, supra note 1, at 8.  
 10 HAGÈGE, supra note 8, at 80. 
 11 NETTLE & ROMAINE, supra note 1, at 8. 
 12 Id. at 7.  
2012] SPEAKING OF SECESSION  557 
With language as the main means by which one engages politically,13 the 
key to a people’s national and cultural identity14 and knowledge,15 how 
language death occurs is a moral and legal question.  If language death is 
“natural,” as is the case when speakers die naturally or there occurs a change 
in the marketable demand for a language,16 linguistic evolution is the 
incidental cause and cannot be held morally or legally responsible.  But an 
intentional political strategy to eliminate a people’s language can hardly be 
called natural, moral, or even legal under international law.  A state giving a 
particular language “official” status is a common political method of 
language favoritism.17  An official language provides a legal guarantee that a 
language will survive in the public sphere18 and effectively marginalizes 
nonofficial languages, particularly linguistic minorities.19  While 
international law does not directly protect a group by declaring that a right to 
an official language exists,20 there is a significant body of international law 
that explicitly recognizes that minority languages must be protected in the 
                                                                                                                   
 13 Lynn Zimmerman, The English-Only Movement: The Power to Silence, in LANGUAGE OF 
THE LAND 115, 117 (Katherine Schuster & David Witkosky eds., 2007); see also Ruth Rubio-
Marín, Exploring the Boundaries of Language Rights: Insiders, Newcomers, and Natives, in 
SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION 136, 136 (Stephen Macedo & Allen Buchanan eds., 
2003) (arguing that unlike religion, a government cannot be passive on the issue of language 
because government must be conducted in some language); Michael Blake, Language Death 
and Liberal Politics, in LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND POLITICAL THEORY 210, 224 (Will Kymlicka 
& Alan Patten eds., 2003) (noting Will Kymlicka’s argument that there is no such thing as 
“benign neglect” when it comes to language).  
 14 Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 116–17 (“National identity is an attempt to unify a 
population legally, linguistically, culturally, and ideologically. . . .  Cultural identity . . . is 
made up of a variety of related patterns of behavior, beliefs, practices, and values that 
generally exist in a historical context.”); see id. at 118 (observing that national and cultural 
identities create individual identity through interaction with others in the state). 
 15 Blake, supra note 13, at 212. 
 16 See id. at 213 (noting that language death can be an inevitable corollary of the goods of 
free agency). 
 17 Alan Patten, Can the Immigrant/National Minority Dichotomy Be Defended? Comment on 
Ruth Rubio-Marín, in SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 13, at 174, 174–75. 
 18 See id. at 175 (“[A]ny piece of public business can be transacted in any of the official 
languages; laws, judgments, and records are kept in all the official languages . . . .”). 
 19 A clear example of the effects of establishing an official language is former French 
President Jacque Chirac’s 1996 declaration that France’s imposition of the French language 
over regional dialects was over, for they no longer posed a threat to French national identity.  
Thierry Brehier, En Bretagne, Jacques Chirac défend les langues régionales [In Britanny, 
Jacque Chirac Defends Regional Languages], LE MONDE, May 31, 1996, translated in Alain 
Fenet, Difference Rights and Language in France, in LANGUAGE, NATION, AND STATE 19, 28 
n.46 (Tony Judt & Denis Lacorne eds., 2004).  
 20 Alan Patten & Will Kymlicka, Language Rights and Political Theory: Context, Issues, 
and Approaches, in LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 13, at 1, 5. 
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same way as any other guaranteed human right,21 such as rights to life, 
expression, and freedom of association.22 
From the rate of language death and extent of state-sanctioned linguistic 
protectionism,23 it is evident that nations do not protect languages to the 
putative degree that international law demands.  This failure to represent and 
preserve nonofficial languages, from the minority perspective, is seen as the 
suppression of identity and individuality and an attempt at assimilation, or 
“state linguicide.”24  The suppression of identity puts minorities on the 
defensive.  Perceiving they are shut out of the political process, minorities 
have used the neglect of a state to recognize minority languages as a casus 
                                                                                                                   
 21 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 2, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of language); 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 14, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (prohibiting discrimination based on language); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 2, 4, 19, 24, 26–27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (prohibiting discrimination based on language) (for those countries 
bound to the ICCPR, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY& 
mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 16, 2012)); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
ICESCR] (prohibiting discrimination based on language) (for those countries bound to the 
ICESCR, see International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY& 
mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 16, 2012)); Convention on the Rights 
of the Child art. 29, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (directing “development of respect for 
the child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values”); International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination pmbl., Dec. 21, 1965, 
660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212 (promoting human rights “without distinction . . . as to . . . language”). 
 22 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 6 (right to life is inherent); id. art. 9 (right to liberty 
and security of person); id. art. 14 (right to fair and public hearing); id. art. 16 (right to be a 
person before the law); id. art. 18 (right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion); id. 
art. 19 (right to hold an opinion); id. art. 21 (right to peaceful assembly); id. art. 22 (right to 
freedom to associate); id. art. 23 (right to marry); id. art. 24 (right to protection of children); 
id. art. 25 (voting rights); id. art. 26 (equality before law). 
 23 NETTLE & ROMAINE, supra note 1, at 7. 
 24 See Patten & Kymlicka, supra note 20, at 5–6 (arguing that part of the recognition of 
language is a symbol of recognition of nationhood, and failure to do the former results in the 
inevitable conflict for the latter); HAGÈGE, supra note 8, at 119 (defining state linguicide as “the 
concerted elimination of one or many languages through explicit political measures”); Rubio-
Marín, supra note 13, at 137 (stating that “ ‘the rallying point of divergent identity has been 
language’ ”) (quoting PIERRE A. COULOMBE, LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN FRENCH CANADA 71 (1996)). 
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belli (cause of war) for nationhood.25  Of these conflicts, the forty-year, 
ongoing struggle for Kurdish independence is illustrative.26  
Should language prove to be inextricable from human rights and 
nationhood, at what point does the infringement of language rights give 
cause for the creation of a separate state for the preservation of a linguistic 
people?  The situation of the Kurds in Turkey exemplifies this question 
because Turkey’s attempts at national unification are carried out through the 
deliberate and creative imposition of the Turkish language with the intent to 
suppress minority languages, specifically Kurdish.27  This Note explores this 
question in four parts.  Part II focuses on determining the requirements 
necessary to state a claim of secession under international law.  Part III 
presents the existing protection of language under international law and the 
extent to which a right to language exists and how it may support a 
secessionist claim.  Using the Kurds in Turkey as an archetype, Part IV 
evaluates the secessionist claim of the Kurds in light of Turkey’s 
enforcement of its official language provision.  Finally, Part V distills 
principles from the Kurds to determine the limits of state language 
imposition before a people may resort to secession as a matter of linguistic 
survival. 
                                                                                                                   
 25 NETTLE & ROMAINE, supra note 1, at 21–22 (arguing that “the boundaries of modern 
nation-states have been arbitrarily drawn,” resulting in indigenous people who are living in 
“nations they had no say in creating and are controlled by groups who do not represent their 
interests,” and suggesting that this difference foments the conflicts between nation-states and 
minority peoples which comprises more than 80% of the world’s conflicts); Patten & Kymlicka, 
supra note 20, at 6 (“Language conflicts are inextricably related to nationalist conflicts . . . .”). 
 26 Although Kurdish uprisings against Turkish oppression have existed since 1938, two 
parties have defended Kurdish identity and demanded the creation of a Kurdish state since the 
1970s: the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TIP) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).  Mary 
Lou O’Neil, Linguistic Human Rights and the Rights of Kurds, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY 
72, 76–77 (Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat ed., 2007); see also Row Erupts After Nine Die in South-
East Turkish Bomb, BBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-1 
1325677 (noting continued terrorist violence after the PKK declared a ceasefire); Turkey 
Reports Heavy PKK Losses After Week of Bombing, BBC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www. 
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14629046 (“The Turkish army says it has killed up to 100 
Kurdish rebels in a week of air and artillery strikes on suspected PKK bases in northern 
Iraq.”); Sebnem Arsu, Turkey Pursues Kurdish Rebels After 24 Soldiers Are Killed Near Iraq, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2011, at A12 (“Kurdish militants killed at least 24 Turkish soldiers in an 
attack near the Iraq border . . . and Turkey’s military responded by sending hundreds of troops 
into northern Iraq in a counterattack on Kurdish insurgent hide-outs.”). 
 27 O’Neil, supra note 26, at 74 (citing Turkey’s attempt to suppress the Kurdish language 
by prohibiting its use in private or public).  
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II.  SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
While it is a well-established tenet of international law that all peoples 
have the right to self-determination,28 the conditions that prompt a “people”29 
to self-determine and to what extent it may exercise this right are both 
subject to dispute.  These disputes fall into three main perspectives: 
minimalist, maximalist, and middle.30 
A.  The Minimalist Position: Limited to No Right to Self-Determination 
The minimalists’ beliefs on secession,31 and, for that matter, self-
determination, range from complete rejection to permitting its existence only 
in the hands of entire state populations, but not minorities.32  The minimalist 
position is grounded in another well-recognized and rival facet of 
international law, uti possidetis, or “territorial integrity.”33  Through this 
doctrine, minimalists substantiate their position by pointing to two main 
arguments.  Principally, if secession were easy to accomplish, it would result 
in an undesirably high degree of factionalism in the world,34 creating tenuous 
and possibly destructive political states.35  For this reason, the stability of 
world peace is better maintained through the sanctity of borders.36  Second, 
minimalists argue that the body of international law that recognizes the 
principle of self-determination deliberately limits the power to extreme 
cases.37  While the United Nations (UN) General Assembly created the 
                                                                                                                   
 28 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 1, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 1, para. 1. 
 29 As with the disputes over the other components of self-determination, there is no 
definition or consensus over what a “people” is.  C.M. Brölmann & M.Y.A. Zieck, Indigenous 
Peoples, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 190 (Catherine Brölmann 
et al. eds., 1993). 
 30 Alexandra Xanthaki, The Right to Self-Determination: Meaning and Scope, in 
MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION 15, 20 (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra 
Xanthaki eds., 2005); see also T.M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, 
in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 29, at 3, 4 (noting three 
approaches to secessionism: no recognition, embrace the theory, and “not embrace secession, 
but assert adherence to human rights and conflict resolution”). 
 31 Secession, specifically known as “external self-determination,” is one of the powers that 
inheres in the right to self-determination.  Xanthaki, supra note 30, at 25. 
 32 Id. at 20. 
 33 Franck, supra note 30, at 4; see also Christian Tomuschat, Secession and Self-
Determination, in SECESSION 23, 38 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2006) (arguing uti possidetis 
obstructs secessionist claims). 
 34 See Tomuschat, supra note 33, at 29 (arguing that should secession be a right to every 
ethnic group, the result would be “infinite fragmentation”). 
 35 Adeno Addis, Cultural Integrity and Political Unity: The Politics of Language in 
Multilingual States, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 719, 734 (2001). 
 36 Tomuschat, supra note 33, at 29. 
 37 Xanthaki, supra note 30, at 24. 
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doctrine of self-determination, it has emphasized, rather, the principle of 
national unity to state severance.38  The UN has not accepted the secession of 
any of its member states since its creation.39  
Unmistakably, secession is extreme, but minimalists are factually 
incorrect to deny the existence of self-determination as a principle of 
international law.40  The central international human rights covenants 
currently in force, namely, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both expressly recognize self-determination as a 
right.41  Additionally, the principle has been recognized in practice, both at 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ)42 and at the domestic level.43  While 
the principle’s history of application may reveal somewhat inconsistent 
successes with respect to secession,44 its positive imprint on international law 
has not been effaced.45 
                                                                                                                   
 38 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).  
Resolution was reaffirmed in the Declaration of the UN World Conference on Human Rights 
in June 1993, World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993), and GA 
Declaration of the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN, G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. 
GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/49, at 13 (Nov. 9, 1995).  See also 
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/1514, at 67 (Dec. 14, 1968) 
(“Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”). 
 39 Tomuschat supra note 33, at 29; cf. Patrick Dumberry, Lessons Learned from the Quebec 
Secession Reference Before the Supreme Court of Canada, in SECESSION, supra note 33, at 
416, 441 (observing that “no entity attempting to secede unilaterally has been admitted to the 
United Nations since 1945 against the wishes of the government of the State from which it 
was trying to secede”). 
 40 Xanthaki, supra note 30, at 21. 
 41 ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 1, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 1, para. 1. 
 42 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, paras. 79, 82 (July 22) [hereinafter 
Secession of Kosovo]. 
 43 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 122 (Can.) [hereinafter 
Secession of Quebec].  However, international mediators have a significant role in resolving 
secessionist disputes.  Diane F. Orentlicher, International Responses to Separatist Claims: Are 
Democratic Principles Relevant?, in SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 13, at 
19, 34. 
 44 DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 257 (1991). 
 45 See Secession of Quebec, supra note 43, para. 114 (“The existence of the right of a people 
to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle 
has acquired a status beyond ‘convention’ and is considered a general principle of international 
law.”).  Recognizing that self-determination may not always be successfully achieved within the 
territorial confines of a state, “a right of secession may arise” under exceptional circumstances.  
Id. para. 122. 
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Moreover, while territorial integrity is undoubtedly necessary to maintain 
the international community, the arguments of uti possidetis are misplaced 
for two primary reasons.  While uti possidetis seems relevant, secession 
normally occurs within the boundaries of an existing state,46 and so, absent 
the involvement of frontiers of another state, the territorial integrity of 
international boundaries are retained and uti possidetis poses no issue.  Thus 
the minimalists’ argument is, in reality, only borrowed from uti possidetis: 
just as interstate boundaries are to be respected, so should international law 
give deference to internal state cohesion.  This was the view of the court in 
the landmark Secession of Quebec case, in which the Quebecois attempted to 
democratically secede from the Canadian federal system.47  There, the 
Supreme Court of Canada stated that “international law places great 
importance on the territorial integrity of nation states and . . . leaves the 
creation of a new state to be determined by the domestic law of the existing 
state of which the seceding entity forms a part.”48  To the dissatisfaction of 
separatists, the required deference to domestic law made it unlikely that a 
self-interested state would permit a people to secede from its territory.49 
However, one of the purposes of secession is to provide oversight for 
international law’s presumption of or favoritism toward state unity.50  
Foremost included in the right to self-determination is the right of a people to 
determine its own “political status and freely pursue [its] economic, social 
and cultural development.”51  For this right to be controlled at the discretion 
of nations—that is, by the very parties at times responsible for oppression—
is to have no right at all.  The Secession of Quebec court contemplated this 
scenario and stated that one of the extreme situations in which a people may 
have the right to external self-determination, i.e., secession, is when a people 
are “denied the ability to exert internally their right to self-determination.”52  
Moreover, the right of self-determination is a tool designed to protect the 
rights of individuals, not nations.53  An argument for the preservation of 
                                                                                                                   
 46 See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising 
from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1498 (1992) (“[I]t is well established 
that . . . the right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time 
of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the States concerned agree otherwise.”). 
 47 Secession of Quebec, supra note 43, para. 112. 
 48 Id.  
 49 See Dietrich Murswiek, The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered, in MODERN LAW 
OF SELF-DETERMINATION 21, 36 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993) (noting that the reason states 
never accepted the principle of self-determination as including secession is that “[a] State-based 
international legal order cannot contain a rule that leads to the destruction of most of the states”). 
 50 See Tomuschat, supra note 33, at 39 (arguing that state deprivation of internal self-
determination to a people puts territorial integrity secondary to the right to self-determination). 
 51 ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 1, para. 1. 
 52 Secession of Quebec, supra note 43, para. 138. 
 53 See Tomuschat, supra note 33, at 41 (“[I]nternational law is designed to preserve 
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borders and a state’s internal structure that is based on the goal of preserving 
international peace must recognize that international peace also hinges on the 
welfare of the people within those states.54  If international law has created a 
presumption in favor of a state’s internal structure, then a state may lose that 
presumption when the well-being of its people is assailed by a state-
sanctioned, “ ‘consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of 
human rights.’ ”55  In the case of oppression, a people’s secessionist 
argument is predicated on the failure of either the state to prevent human 
rights violations or the international community to intervene.56  Where 
thwarting state oppression is the secessionist “just cause,” secession is said to 
be remedial, and has been notably successful in the past.57 
B.  The Maximalist Position: Self-Determination as an Evolving Right 
Maximalists view international law’s broad language concerning the right 
to self-determination as an evolving tool that serves the needs of the 
international community by righting global wrongs.58  The maximalist 
position accepts at face value that a people may secede not only in the 
extreme situations of human rights violations, but for arguably weaker, 
economic and cultural reasons.59  Maximalists justify their position by 
pointing to the ICCPR and the ICESCR, which both define the right of self-
determination in terms of “economic, social and cultural development” in 
their first articles,60 and argue from their legislative history that these articles 
were meant to be broadly interpreted.  For example, a proposed amendment 
aiming to further refine these terms was rejected on the basis that “any 
numeration of the components of the right of self-determination was likely to 
be incomplete.”61  The maximalist views this history of rejecting 
                                                                                                                   
international peace and security and the well-being of individual human beings.”). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. (quoting E.S.C. Res. 1503 (XLVIII), E/4832/Add.1 (May 27, 1970)); see also id. at 
41 (“[I]f a State strays from [promoting and encouraging human rights], not just by negligence 
but on account of a deliberate policy, it may forfeit the protection it enjoys by virtue of 
international law.”). 
 56 See Wayne Norman, Domesticating Secession, in SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION, 
supra note 13, at 193, 198 (describing how oppression and exploitation further a “just cause” 
theory of secession). 
 57 See Tomuschat, supra note 33, at 42 (noting the independence of Bangladesh and rise of 
Kosovo as examples of remedial session). 
 58 Xanthaki, supra note 30, at 28. 
 59 Id. at 26. 
 60 ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 1, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 21, art. 1, para. 1. 
 61 MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 34 (1987); Tomuschat, supra note 33, at 26. 
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enumerations of the right of self-determination as sanctioning the broad 
availability of the right.  
The greatest weakness of the maximalist position is that, as it disregards 
concrete boundaries, it is unrestrained and therefore unworkable in practice.  
First, even if self-determination should be considered broadly, there are 
alternative and less drastic means available to attempt to remedy perceived 
wrongs.62  By encouraging individuals to ignore the domestic political 
process or resort to international tribunals, rights normally enforced by other 
bodies are shrouded beneath the “umbrella-right” of self-determination and 
therefore dilute its use.63  Second, there are settled internal restraints imposed 
upon the right to self-determination.  The right to self-determination is only 
available to “peoples” under the ICCPR, and not to minorities, whose groups 
could be legion and are given a different set of rights in Article 27.64  Thus, 
minorities are held to be an example of those who must seek the enforcement 
of their rights elsewhere.  Additionally, in practice, the right of self-
determination is often not executed through the judicial process, but instead 
by force through the greater powers theory65 and the effectivity doctrine, 
both of which propose that secession is based on political reality and force, 
not legality.66   
The independence of Bangladesh is one of the few examples of secession 
in recent history67 and one of several examples of the effectivity doctrine.  In 
the 1970s, Pakistan initiated a brutal policy of repression against the East 
Pakistanis that were calling for independence.68  While the UN did not take a 
stance on the secessionist claim, India delivered massive support to the East 
Pakistanis, causing Pakistan to withdraw from the eastern part of the 
country.69  In 1974, it was uncontested among the international community 
                                                                                                                   
 62 See Xanthaki, supra note 30, at 28 (arguing that separate international channels, such as 
UNESCO, are available for the enforcement of cultural rights). 
 63 Id. (construing Gudmundur Alfredsson, Different Forms of and Claims to the Right of 
Self-Determination, in SELF-DETERMINATION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 58 (Donald 
Clark & Robert Williamson eds., 1996)) (describing the use of self-determination as an 
umbrella under which a broad range of rights are enforced). 
 64 Article 27 states in its entirety: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”  ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 27. 
 65 See generally Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans,” 
Secession, and the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 137 (2010) (articulating the great 
powers theory, whereby a secessionist claim is often achieved through international 
recognition from great powers, rather than through legal recognition).  
 66 Dumberry, supra note 39, at 436–37.  The doctrine represents secession through a 
political act not based on any precondition, such as oppression, or legal principle.  Id. 
 67 Tomuschat, supra note 33, at 30. 
 68 Id. at 29–30. 
 69 Id. at 30. 
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that Bangladesh was a new state.70  A maximalist might interpret the tacit 
conduct of the UN as concluding that the creation of Bangladesh was a valid 
execution of the principle of self-determination under the broad terms of 
“right” in an evolving international context.  However, without constraint, a 
secessionist claim brought through the effectivity doctrine may reduce the 
legitimacy of a claim to no more than “might makes right.” 
C.  The Middle Position: Reconciling the Extremes of Self-Determination 
The middle position is aimed at using the minimalist’s interests in 
territorial integrity to restrain the maximalist’s unlimited exercise of self-
determination.71  Self-determination is recognized, but a people must first 
resort to domestic political means before exercising this right.72  Only after 
domestic means have failed to remedy the injury, and a people’s civil and 
political rights are continually denied—depending on the gravity of the 
interest at stake—does a claim to self-determination accrue to the injured 
people.73  Due to the emphasis on state sovereignty in international law, a 
                                                                                                                   
 70 Id.  
 71 See Franck, supra note 30, at 4 (describing the middle position by combining the 
extremes of embracing a secessionist cause and rejecting it entirely in favor of static borders); 
Xanthaki, supra note 30, at 29 (noting an alternative approach as one that balances the 
advantages of the minimalist and maximalist approaches); Murswiek, supra note 49, at 24 
(describing the small minority of maximalists that endorse “unlimited jus secedendi” for all 
peoples). 
 72 See Murswiek, supra note 49, at 39 (“Only if a State deprives a people of its right to 
internal self-determination (which . . . does not absolve the people from its duty of allegiance 
to the State as a whole), must territorial integrity stand behind the right of self-
determination.”); cf. Franck, supra note 30, at 15 (discussing that, as a matter of course, 
secessionist movements first are “being managed by a process of conflict resolution without 
recourse to the language and procedures of international law”). 
 73 C. Lloyd Brown-John, Self-Determination, Autonomy and State Secession in Federal 
Constitutional and International Law, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 567, 586 (1999) (“[I]t is clear that a 
minority who are ‘geographically separate’ and who are ‘distinct ethnically and culturally’ 
and who have been placed in a position of subordination may have a right to secede.  That 
right, however, could only be exercised if there is a clear constitutional denial of political, 
linguistic, cultural and religious rights.”); Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical 
Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 381 (2003); see also Murswiek, supra note 
49, at 25 (“ ‘The right of secession unquestionably exists, however, in a special, but very 
important case: that of peoples, territories and entities subjugated in violation of international 
law.’ ” (quoting Special Rapporteur, The Right to Self-Determination, Historical and Current 
Development on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of 
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, para. 183 (1981) 
(by Aureliu Cristescu))).  Additionally, the fact that a claim to self-determination requires 
certain conditions before it is exercised leads one commentator to consider self-determination 
a principle, rather than a right.  Xanthaki, supra note 30, at 21. 
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just claim to secession must rely on state action that violates a people’s 
“fundamental human rights, evidently and severely.”74  
The purpose of the middle position is to strike a balance between the 
“vicious circle” of state sovereignty and self-determination.75  Though this 
compromise gives great weight to a state’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, this emphasis is not unimpeachable.  If a people present a clear 
case that a state has failed to represent the people’s interests in the political 
process and has continually denied the people’s basic human rights, 
territorial deference is forfeited.76  When an affirmative case for external 
self-determination is demonstrated, under the principle of uti possidetis, the 
new state is limited to the boundaries of the state the people currently 
occupy.77 
This middle position is a form of remedial secession and is by no means 
simply espoused in theory by many scholars,78 but has been inferred as 
possible grounds for a secessionist claim in practice.  Two recent 
international law cases regarding secession stand out: In re Secession of 
Quebec79 and, most recently, the Kosovo advisory opinion on “whether the 
declaration of [Kosovo’s] independence is in accordance with international 
law.”80  First, in the Secession of Quebec case, the Canadian Supreme Court 
held that the Quebecois did not state a secessionist claim because they were 
not denied access to the political process nor were their human rights 
oppressed in any way.81  This holding implies that if a denial to the political 
process and disregard for human rights were found, Quebec would have been 
able to unilaterally secede from Canada.82  Second, in the Kosovo secession 
opinion, while the ICJ was careful not to address the issue of whether 
remedial secession justified Kosovo’s right to independence,83 the ICJ’s 
decision to hold valid Kosovo’s independence doubly impacts the issue of 
secession: (1) declaration of independence is not exclusively an act of 
domestic constitutional law, but one of public international law;84 and (2) as 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Murswiek, supra note 49, at 26.  Murswiek also notes that there might be an argument 
that severe discrimination constitutes an unjustifiable use of “aggression” according to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.  Id.; G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 75 Murswiek, supra note 49, at 24. 
 76 Scharf, supra note 73, at 382, 384. 
 77 Id. at 384. 
 78 For a list of scholars that endorse this view of remedial secession, see id. at 381 n.58. 
 79 Secession of Quebec, supra note 43.  
 80 Secession of Kosovo, supra note 42, pt. IV. 
 81 Secession of Quebec, supra note 43, para. 154. 
 82 Scharf, supra note 73, at 383. 
 83 Secession of Kosovo, supra note 42, para. 83. 
 84 Robert Muharremi, A Note on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, 11 GERMAN L.J. 867, 
873 (2010). 
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a declaration of independence is the culmination of a secessionist claim, it is 
possible for a people that have suffered grave human rights violations to state 
a secessionist claim.85 
III.  LANGUAGE PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW  
It must be noted that there is no absolute international legal right to a 
minority language.86  Thus, when one speaks of a topic as sensitive as 
language rights, one must be aware that the critical difference between a 
moral and legal right is enforceability.  Moral rights may be common fare in 
the philosophical world, but they are more foreign in international law.87  
The moral argument for linguistic protection, combined with the modern 
trend in international law to protect language rights and the heightened 
protection of linguistic minorities under ICCPR Article 27,88 all give a strong 
basis for language rights to be considered protected human rights. 
A.  Moral Argument for Language as a Human Right 
There are three moral justifications for language preservation: language is 
inextricably related to a people’s identity; language is required to participate 
in the political process; and language adds diversity to the world as 
knowledge itself.89 
First, language as integral to identity arguably provides the strongest 
reason for language preservation as a moral and human right.  Language is a 
critical part of self-understanding and social self-description.90  Through 
language, people have a cultural link to their past, present, and future.91  A 
person’s identity is created as a result of dynamic interaction with others in 
the public sphere.92  National and cultural identities are significantly 
determined by the collective identity of language.93  More specifically, 
                                                                                                                   
 85 Thomas Burri, The Kosovo Opinion and Secession: The Sounds of Silence and Missing 
Links, 11 GERMAN L.J. 881, 885–86 (2010). 
 86 Patten & Kymlicka, supra note 20, at 5. 
 87 Fernand de Varennes, The Existing Rights of Minorities in International Law, in 
LANGUAGE: A RIGHT AND A RESOURCE 117, 117 (Miklόs Kontra et al. eds., 1999).  
 88 ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 27. 
 89 See Blake, supra note 13, at 212 (“[T]hree distinct forms of cost [of language extinction] 
might be identified: costs understood in terms of identity and self-description; costs deriving 
from communicative interests; and costs to the world as a whole deriving from the loss of 
diversity and knowledge.”). 
 90 Id. at 213. 
 91 Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 117.  
 92 Id. at 117–18. 
 93 See id. at 116–17 (“National identity is an attempt to unify a population legally, 
linguistically, culturally, and ideologically. . . . The dominant culture in a country is often 
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national identity unifies a people legally, linguistically, culturally, and 
ideologically.94  Thus the elimination of language can entail the elimination 
of one’s human identity,95 and comes with it a price: In areas that emphasize 
cultural assimilation, studies of immigrant families indicate that lack of 
identity results in feelings of inferiority, post-traumatic stress,96 and 
fearfulness, and causes marginalization from the community.97  
Second, as a practical matter, language preservation is a political 
necessity.  Unlike religion, to which government may remain neutral, 
political discourse must be undertaken in some language.98  For this reason, 
government cannot simply tolerate language in the same way as religion.99  
In effect, the destruction of language means the elimination of a political 
voice in elections,100 an uneducated electorate, and an inability to understand 
the law.101 
Finally, as an aesthetic and scholarly matter, language has value as a 
“unique human achievement.”102  Each language captures and presents the 
world through the eyes of a people.103  From language springs culture, 
technology, and the arts.104  With the death of any language, injustice is done 
to the past and the future is robbed of intellectual and aesthetic diversity. 
There are three serious objections to these moral arguments.  The first 
addresses the argument on the basis of aesthetic appeal: that the value 
ascribed to language as a source of beauty and as a repository of knowledge 
is simply too difficult to quantify into political and legal understanding.105  
Language preservation, it is argued, should instead be founded on more 
concrete terms, such as political necessity.  The second objection is that there 
is no such thing as a pure language,106 and that the type of language that is in 
                                                                                                                   
considered to be synonymous with national identity . . . . This [cultural and political] 
socialization is usually accomplished through the use of language.”). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Blake, supra note 13, at 213. 
 96 Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 118, 126. 
 97 Judy Smith-Davis, The New Immigrant Students Need More than ESL, EDUC. DIGEST, 
Apr. 2004, at 21, 24. 
 98 Rubio-Marín, supra note 13, at 136. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Blake, supra note 13, at 214; Rubio-Marín, supra note 13, at 136.  
 101 See Rubio-Marín, supra note 13, at 136 (noting the need for language to educate, create 
laws, adjudicate, and have elections). 
 102 Blake, supra note 13, at 216. 
 103 See NETTLE & ROMAINE, supra note 1, at 14 (“Each language has its own window on the 
world. . . .  It is a loss to every one of us if a fraction of that diversity disappears when there is 
something that can have been done to prevent it.”). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Blake, supra note 13, at 217. 
 106 Id. at 216. 
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need of preservation is a living language.107  Living languages develop 
alongside other cultures, undergo constant change, and must survive the 
threat of substitution, or else, by definition, are dead.108  Ironically, if it 
follows that languages are mutable by nature, the preservation of languages 
can also hinder their natural development.  A third objection focus on the 
question that if governments protect languages, how should they determine 
which languages to protect?  Arguably, not all situations demand the same 
level of linguistic protection.  For example, preserving the language of an 
indigenous people might be more justified than that of an immigrant people; 
a state could argue that the price of emigration is the requirement that 
immigrants forsake their native language to embrace a new culture.109  
These objections, however, fail to take into account that the true moral 
gravity of language death lies in the cause of death.110  Cultural, economic, 
and linguistic shifts may be part of the natural order and are thus 
unobjectionable, but only when they result from free choices.111  However, a 
state policy to legally ban or suppress minority languages is coercion, not the 
speaker’s free choice, and thus a matter of moral concern.112 
B.  Legal Argument for Language as a Human Right 
Although there is no guaranteed right to the use of one’s language, 
linguistic minorities receive unique language protection under international 
law.  Under general international law, individuals as a whole are guaranteed 
                                                                                                                   
 107 See HAGÈGE, supra note 8, at 76 (“[A] living language would be defined as one of a 
community that renews its native speakers by itself.  And a dead language . . . would be one of 
a community in which native competence has totally disappeared, to the extent that the native 
speakers had only imperfectly transmitted their knowledge, and their descendants in turn do 
not transmit an ability to speak and to understand the idiom of the group.”). 
 108 Id. at 76–77. 
 109 Rubio-Marín, supra note 13, at 139; see infra text accompanying note 209 (noting that 
forsaking one’s culture is a requirement for French citizenship). 
 110 Blake, supra note 13, at 211 (arguing that language assimilation is a matter of moral 
gravity). 
 111 Rubio-Marín, supra note 13, at 159.  Two counter-perspectives on this subject are 
immigrant transnationalism—“the tendency of immigrants to maintain regular connections 
back to their country of origin”—and immigrant multiculturalism—a movement that declares 
that immigrants should not have to pay the price of their ethnic identity in order to integrate.  
Patten & Kymlicka, supra note 20, at 8; see also Stella Burch Elias, Regional Minorities, 
Immigrants, and Migrants: The Reframing of Minority Language Rights in Europe, 28 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 261, 311 (arguing for the retention of language rights protection for 
immigrants). 
 112 See Nazila Ghanea, Repressing Minorities and Getting Away with It? A Consideration of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION, 
supra note 30, at 193, 209 (“[T]he slow silencing of a minority group . . . is no less 
discriminatory or cruel than sudden and bloody episodes against them.”). 
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the right to be free of discrimination on the basis of language.113  In this 
sense, languages are protected universally to some degree.  However, this 
protection does not ensure that language itself will be protected; it only 
ensures that one will not be discriminated against on the basis of language.  
It is only under Article 27 of the ICCPR that minority language and 
cultural rights specifically are protected: “In those States in which ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, 
or to use their own language.”114  This minority right exists separate from all 
other rights guaranteed under the ICCPR.115  
However, critics have argued two reasons that Article 27 is not the broad 
aegis that minorities claim.  First, the phrasing of the right is notably distinct 
from other affirmative guarantees in the ICCPR, namely, that “shall not be 
denied the right” is in the negative.116  From this deviation, critics have 
argued that the level of protection is unclear, with one critic noting that “it 
represents ‘a classic example of restrictive toleration of minorities.’ ”117  A 
second criticism against a broad interpretation of Article 27 is that language 
protection applies to individuals, not groups.118  If Article 27 does not impose 
an affirmative duty on states to advance or protect the use of minority 
                                                                                                                   
 113 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (“To achieve international cooperation 
in . . . promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to . . . language . . . .”); id. art. 55 (“United Nations shall 
promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to . . . language . . . .”); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
supra note 21, art. 2 (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . language . . . .”); Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 21, art. 14 (“The enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on 
any ground such as . . . language . . . .”); ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 2, para. 1 (“[E]nsure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . language . . . .”); ICESCR, supra note 21, 
art. 2, para. 2 (“[G]uarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised 
without discrimination of any kind as to . . . language . . . .”). 
 114 ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 27. 
 115 See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, U.N. Human Rights Comm., General 
Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27), para. 1, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 
8, 1994) [hereinafter General Comment No. 23] (“[T]his article establishes and recognizes a 
right which is conferred on individuals belonging to minority groups and which is distinct 
from, and additional to, all the other rights which, as individuals in common with everyone 
else, they are already entitled to enjoy under the Covenant.”). 
 116 Id.  
 117 PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 178 (1991) 
(quoting JACOB ROBINSON, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 89 (1971)). 
 118 These critics point to General Comment 23 to ICCPR Article 27, which states, “The 
Committee observes that this article establishes and recognizes a right which is conferred on 
individuals belonging to minority groups . . . .”  General Comment No. 23, para. 1. 
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languages, states may satisfy the requirement by simply not harming an 
individual linguistic minority.119  The travaux préparatoires120 also illustrate 
the delegate of Mexico’s insistence that Article 27 be written in an 
affirmative way, so as to give linguistic minorities special protection.121  By 
implication, critics argue that the drafters intended the negative 
interpretation.122 
Based on investigations of minority human rights violations, the Special 
Rapporteur on Minorities123 statutorily interprets a positive reading.124  
Minorities rarely possess the human and financial resources to advance their 
cultural development.125  Furthermore, minorities are unlikely to be in a 
position to assert universal rights under other articles, such as the freedom of 
expression and association.126  Thus, for Article 27 to play the protective 
role, which minorities cannot be politically expected to assume, it must be 
given independent force through a positive reading.127  
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has also weighed in.  First, in the 
HRC’s commentary to Article 27, General Comment 23 supports both the 
idea that linguistic rights are treated collectively and need to be positively 
enforced.128  Second, recent cases handled before the HRC appear to have 
taken the more forceful, positive reading of Article 27, imposing upon states 
an obligation to remedy disadvantages arising out of linguistic minority 
status and secure minority language rights.129  In the end, the HRC seems to 
have endorsed a positive view. 
                                                                                                                   
 119 THORNBERRY, supra note 117, at 178. 
 120 “Materials used in preparing the ultimate form of an agreement or statute, and esp. of an 
international treaty; the draft or legislative history of a treaty.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1638 (9th ed. 2009). 
 121 THORNBERRY, supra note 117, at 179. 
 122 Id. 
 123 The United Nations appoints special rapporteurs for certain divisions “to monitor and report 
how people’s human rights are protected or violated.”  The Special Rapporteurs, BBC, http://ne 
ws.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/documentary_archive/5295942.stm (last updated Aug. 29, 2006). 
 124 THORNBERRY, supra note 117, at 180. 
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 General Comment No. 23, supra note 115, para. 6.1 (“Although article 27 is expressed in 
negative terms, that article, nevertheless, does recognize the existence of a ‘right’ and requires 
that it shall not be denied.  Consequently, a State party is under an obligation to ensure that the 
existence and the exercise of this right are protected against their denial or violation.  Positive 
measures of protection are, therefore, required . . . .”); id. para. 6.2 (“Although the rights 
protected under article 27 are individual rights, they depend in turn on the ability of the 
minority group to maintain its culture, language or religion.”). 
 129 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Sudan, para. 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.85 (Nov. 19, 1997) (finding that 
where there was “no recognition in law of the right to use local languages in official 
communications or administrative or court proceedings, . . . [e]mphasis should be given to the 
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C.  Scope of Protection of Minority Language Rights as Human Rights 
Through Article 27, linguistic minorities are assured some manner of 
protection to the point at which they might have, according to the HRC and 
its commentary, a certain right to their language.  Despite this protection, a 
state is free to designate its own separate official language.130  The creation 
of an official language has its functional advantages, but it also discriminates 
on the basis of language and can deprive nonnative speakers of the use of 
their native tongue.131  With minority language rights in tension with official 
language laws, it is important to know specific instances in which Article 27 
will protect linguistic minorities.  
These instances can be separated into two areas: the private and public 
spheres.  In the private sphere, the following linguistic rights are protected 
under Article 27, though this list is not exhaustive: the right to speak or write 
a language among family members;132 the right of individuals to use their 
own names, as well as their own script;133 the right to media broadcasting in 
one’s own language (though a state is not obligated to provide funding for 
such broadcasting);134 the right to create and operate educational facilities in 
a minority language;135 and the right to use one’s preferred language in their 
business relationships.136 
                                                                                                                   
need of ethnic and religious minorities . . . to pursue and develop their traditions, culture and 
language, as required by article 27 of the Covenant”); U.N. Human Rights Comm., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Algeria, para. 15, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.95 (Aug. 18, 1998) (recommending that the Arabic Language Decree, which 
imposed “compulsory, immediate and exclusive use of [Arabic] in all areas of public 
activity[,] . . . be urgently reviewed so as to remove the negative consequences it produces” on 
Berber and French populations). 
 130 Fernand de Varennes, Linguistic Identity and Language Rights, in UNIVERSAL MINORITY 
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TREATY 
BODIES 283 (Marc Weller ed., 2007). 
 131 Cf. id. (“No treaty provision anywhere in the world places an official language above 
basic rights such as freedom of expression or non-discrimination.”).  There are alternative 
methods for dealing with the problem of managing an official language in the midst of a 
multi-lingual society.  A type of federalism is one such approach, but is beyond the scope of 
this Note.  See generally Sujit Choudhry, Managing Linguistic Nationalism Through 
Constitutional Design: Lessons from South Asia, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 577 (2009) (managing 
multi-lingual societies through constitutional design); Addis, supra note 35 (addressing the 
compatibility issue of language in a pluralist society). 
 132 de Varennes, supra note 87, at 118 (citing U.N. Human Rights Comm., Ballantyne v. 
Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989, 385/1989/Rev.1 (1993); U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., Lovelace v. Canada, U.N. Doc. A/36/40, at 166 (1977)). 
 133 Id. at 120–22. 
 134 Id. at 122–23. 
 135 Id. at 124 (citing Minority Schools in Albania (Greece v. Alb.), Advisory Opinion No. 
26, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64 (Apr. 6)). 
 136 Id. at 125.  
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It is not surprising to find similar linguistic rights protected in the public 
sphere.  Where there is a concentration of linguistic minorities, “an 
appropriate level” of public services must be provided in the minority 
languages.137  The state must provide educational services in minority 
languages where, given the size of the linguistic minority, it would be 
reasonable for the state to do so.138  In judicial proceedings, linguistic 
minorities have the right to an interpreter and to be informed of the 
proceedings in a language they understand.139  In the case of meetings of 
elected bodies, a politician must be permitted to use a minority language 
during meetings or sessions “to the extent to which it is appropriate given the 
number of speakers and the particular type of state function concerned.”140 
In sum, the general protection of linguistic minority rights found in 
Article 27 includes the same basic human rights identified by the morality-
based arguments.141  The protection of language in the family and public 
sphere promotes the development of a person’s cultural identity in and out of 
the home.  Permitting minority language to be a tool of commerce and 
method of discourse with government preserves the functionality of 
language.  Finally, ensuring the use of language in the field of education 
furthers language itself as a repository of knowledge that can enhance the 
diversity of the world.  Therefore, one may say with confidence that minority 
language rights are both moral and legally enforceable human rights. 
D.  How a People May Be Protected by Linguistic Minority Rights 
A secessionist claim based on severe state-sanctioned, infringement of 
linguistic rights without a democratic remedy will be strongest in the hands 
of a linguistic minority, since, as shown above, linguistic minorities are 
protected to a degree rivaling a fundamental human right under Article 27.142  
Without such protection, there exists only minimal state duty to preserve 
language—namely, the duties of nondiscrimination under the prior articles.  
However, only a “people” retains the right to self-determination under 
Article 1.143  Consequently, minorities are denied the exercise of any right to 
external self-determination.144  
                                                                                                                   
 137 Id. at 128–29. 
 138 Id. at 130. 
 139 Id. at 132–33. 
 140 Id. at 136–37. 
 141 See supra Part III.A (laying out the arguments relating language to people’s identity, 
political participation, and diversity of knowledge).  
 142 See supra Part III.B (evidencing positive interpretation of Article 27’s protection of 
linguistic minorities). 
 143 ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 1, para. 1. 
 144 Xanthaki, supra note 30, at 17. 
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Nevertheless, it is still possible for a “people” to retain Article 27 
linguistic protection by being classified as a “minority” under a certain, 
frequently used definition of “minority.”  Neither within nor without the 
ICCPR is there a universally accepted definition or set of criteria that define 
what a “people” is.145  A people “may include only a portion of the 
population of an existing state.”146  Accepted characteristics of a “people” 
include: “common historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity, cultural 
homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious or ideological affinity, territorial 
connection, common economic life, and consisting of a certain minimum 
number.”147 
“Minority,” too, is not defined in the ICCPR.148  The General Comment 
indicates, however, that a minority is composed of “those who belong to a 
group and who share a common culture, a religion, and/or a language.”149  A 
traditional and well-cited definition of a “minority” is the Special Rapporteur 
of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities Francesco Capotorti’s formulation: 
[A minority is a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the 
population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose 
members—being nationals of the State—possess ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the 
rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of 
solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, 
religion or language.150 
Comparing these definitions of “minority” with those generally accepted 
descriptions of a “people,” the one difference between the two is the size of 
the population of a designated area.  The HRC case Ballantyne et al. v. 
Canada addressed this issue of how a group is to be determined as a 
“minority” on the basis of population area.  There, the court held that 
“minorities referred to in article 27 are minorities within such a State, and 
                                                                                                                   
 145 SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
100–01 (2000); General Comment No. 23, supra note 115; see also Secession of Quebec, 
supra note 43, para. 123 (noting that there has been “little formal elaboration of the definition 
of ‘peoples,’ ” leaving the precise meaning uncertain). 
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not minorities within any province.  A group may constitute a majority in a 
province but still be a minority in a State and thus be entitled to the benefits 
of article 27.”151  Thus, Canadian English speakers could not be considered a 
linguistic minority in a given province in Canada for purposes of Article 27 
because English is the majority language of the entire nation.152 
In sum, a group of individuals, sharing only a common history of 
traditions and language, sufficiently large and concentrated enough to be an 
identifiable “people,” yet numerically smaller than the rest of the state’s 
population, may be considered a “people” and still reap the heightened 
linguistic protections of Article 27.  As the following part indicates, this 
minority-people duality serves an important purpose: to protect a people with 
independent minority rights when it is too weak politically to pursue its 
interests against an overpowering democratic majority.  
IV.  KURDISH OPPRESSION IN TURKEY AS ARCHETYPAL LINGUISTIC 
SECESSION 
The Kurds in Turkey have a legitimate claim to secession solely on the 
basis of generations of linguistic oppression.  To begin, the Kurds in Turkey 
enjoy the dual statuses of a people and a linguistic minority under the 
ICCPR.  Regarding the former, historically, Kurds have been a nomadic, 
tribal people, located in the border areas of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.153  
For around two thousand years, they have lived together in the Middle East 
as an recognizable group.154  With about 75% of Kurds as followers of Sunni 
Islam,155 the Kurds share a common religion.  Most importantly, the common 
language of the Kurds is Kurdish.156 
In terms of demographics, southeast Turkey is home to the majority of 
Kurds in the world.  There, almost 14 million Kurds are concentrated, 
accounting for approximately 18% of Turkey’s total population.157  With 
respect to the entire country of Turkey, however, they are a demographic 
minority.  Combined with their common language, the Kurds are classified 
as a linguistic minority; this gives them heightened linguistic rights 
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protection under ICCPR Article 27.  Even under the critical view of 
Article 27, these linguistic rights include a state’s obligation not to harm the 
language. 
To the contrary, since the ratification of the Turkish Constitution in 1924, 
the Turkish government has executed a policy of “Turkification”158—a 
policy to solve what critics have called the “Kurdish question.”159  A key 
provision in the 1924 Turkish Constitution that set into motion decades of 
linguistic oppression was the declaration that Turkish was the official 
language of the nation.160  Even since more liberal versions of the Turkish 
Constitution have been passed, this provision still stands, strengthened by the 
introductory clause that “[t]he Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is 
an indivisible entity.”161  Throughout Turkey’s history, the Turkish 
government has used this provision to impose the use of the Turkish 
language and ban minority language use as a separatist act. 
Since the establishment of Turkish as the official language of Turkey, the 
Turkish government has implemented policies to assimilate any other 
language, particularly Kurdish.  The constitution made it illegal to speak 
Kurdish in public places.162  The word “Kurdistan” was no longer listed in 
educational books.163  Except for certain non-Muslim groups—which did not 
include the Kurds—Turkish was the exclusive language of education.164  
With the passage of the Settlement Law of 1934, the government mandated 
that those who did not use Turkish as their first language relocate to mainly 
Turkish speaking areas.165 
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Even though the Turkish Constitution of 1960 was considered more 
liberal than the 1924 Constitution,166 the Turkish agenda of assimilating the 
Kurds remained the same.167  While Kurdish publications increased in 
number, Turkish law required them to be translated and frequently banned 
separatist publications for discussing Kurdish issues.168  In 1961, Turkish 
parliament mandated that Kurdish children attend boarding schools where 
they were required to learn Turkish.169  Law No. 1587 permitted the Turkish 
government to alter the names of Kurdish geographic locations to Turkish 
ones on the grounds of preserving Turkish “ ‘national culture, moral values, 
traditions and customs.’ ”170  The 1967 Turkish parliament forbade “the 
importation and distribution of Kurdish language materials” for the same 
reasons.171 
The Kurds revolted violently to the assimilatory laws.172  In response, 
Turkish regulation of language became harsher.  Law No. 2932 made it 
illegal “ ‘to express, diffuse or publish opinions in any language other than 
the main official language of states recognized by the Turkish state,’ ” which 
did not include Kurdish.173  The denial of Kurdish existence persisted174 and 
emergency gubernatorial power suppressed news publications regarding the 
Kurdish situation.175  In 1991, the Turkish government legalized the private 
use of Kurdish, but, in the same breath, passed a new Antiterrorism Law that 
considered any protest against the character of the Turkish state an illegal, 
separatist act.176  Under this law, even the simple promotional use of 
Kurdish, as an unofficial language, could be considered a separatist act 
against the character of the Turkish state. 
When Turkey’s constitutional reforms came in 2002, their impetus was 
the desire to accede to the European Union.177  However, as in the past, these 
reforms were significantly qualified.  Previously, Article 26 of the Turkish 
Constitution banned the use of Kurdish with the provision, “no language 
prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of 
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thought”; this clause no longer exists after the 2002 reforms.178  Its removal 
allows for the use of Kurdish on radio and television broadcasts, subject to 
daily and weekly time restraints and translation requirements.179  
Additionally, the new reforms permit education to be delivered in different 
languages and dialects of the people, but this amenity is only available to 
private language courses.180  However, there remains a restriction on all 
broadcasts and educational courses that they must not “ ‘contradict the 
fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic and the indivisible integrity 
of the state.’ ”181  Finally, in 2003, the ban on Kurdish names was lifted, but 
names cannot contain the letters Q, W, and X, which are common in 
Kurdish, but nonexistent in Turkish.182 
The legal treatment of Kurdish has changed very little since the 2002 
reforms, despite the attempt at reconciliation through the 2010 Democratic 
Initiative—a recent attempt at improving the Turkish government’s 
relationship with the Kurds.183  After seeing some success by establishing a 
Kurdish only TV channel, this initiative purported to solve the Kurdish 
question and put an end to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party’s (PKK) militant 
operations to establish an independent Kurdistan with big promises:184 the 
creation of a commission to combat discrimination; the renaming of areas by 
local residents; freedom for political parties to communicate in unofficial 
languages;185 Kurdish as “an elective course in secondary schools and high 
schools”;186 the extension of the all Kurdish TV channel to private channels 
with state funds; and Kurdish religious sermons in the southeast delivered in 
Kurdish.187  Notably, the ban on the use of Q, W, and X would not be 
lifted,188 nor would there be an amendment to the first three constitutional 
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articles establishing, inter alia, a unitary state and official language.189  None 
of these reforms have been legislatively passed,190 and the PKK remain at 
large.191  Furthermore, should any reforms be passed, the fear is that the 
Turkish Constitutional Court will hold any legislation that violates the 
integrity of the Turkish state unconstitutional.192 
After nearly a century of linguistic oppression, Kurdish has adapted to its 
unwelcome presence in Turkey.  Despite its survival, the linguistic effects 
are devastating.  The deportation of Kurds and their literature and the 
prevention of Kurdish use has resulted in the creation of three different 
alphabets for the same language.193  Many Kurds are likely considered to be 
illiterate in their own language, since few Kurds would even read what has 
been produced during the twentieth century.194  Even after Turkey’s 2002 
reforms, the basic constitutional provisions that permitted Turkey to punish 
Kurdish language use as acts of separatism remain in force and are a 
considerable obstacle to any reforms that have been put forth, particularly the 
remaining language of Article 26.195  This article gives everyone the right to 
individual expression,196 but Kurds attempting to assert their individual 
identity are impaired by the fundamental tenets of the Turkish Constitution: 
the Turkish character of the Republic and the “indivisible integrity of the 
State.”197  Not only has the linguistic damage been done, Turkish reforms do 
not offer assurance that Kurdish will be protected in the face of immutable 
constitutional provisions.  Even as Kurds are a linguistic minority, Turkish 
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fears of separatism prevent them from recognizing the Kurds as a legal 
minority.198 
The aggressive Kurdish responses to Turkish treatment belie the political 
and judicial means by which Kurds have asserted their cultural identity, but 
without success.  The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has found 
many violations to the life, liberty, and property of the Kurds.199  For 
example, in an effort to support minority rights and protect political parties, 
the ECHR overruled a Turkish Constitutional Court decision200 which uphold 
the dissolution of a Kurdish political party on the grounds that the party’s 
assertion of the existence of “two nations” within Turkey, the Turks and the 
Kurds, violated the Turkish Constitution’s provision that Turkey was unitary 
and indivisible.201  This is one of many cases in which the ECHR finds 
violations to life, liberty, and property of Kurds.202  Even so, Turkey remains 
politically steadfast against the use of Kurdish in the public setting.203  In 
another blow to Kurdish use of the political process, the same Constitutional 
Court disbanded a pro-Kurdish political party on the basis that its “actions 
and statements,” such as speeches made at political rallies, “became a focal 
point for terrorism against the indivisible integrity of the state.”204 
Stepping back from the canvas of history, it is evident that for nearly a 
century, Turkey has failed to provide basic protections to the Kurds as a 
linguistic minority.  Since its inception as a nation, Turkish policy has been 
one of cultural assimilation, invading both the public and private spheres of 
ICCPR Article 27 linguistic protection,205 from the basic use of language—
script and name-giving (personal and geographic)—to publications and 
political recognition.  In terms of domestic political resolutions, Turkish 
linguistic rights reforms have been of a shell game nature.  For nearly every 
                                                                                                                   
 198 See Gökay, supra note 162, at 333–34 (“[M]any Turkish nationalists fear that allowing 
Kurdish in public settings could encourage separatists sentiments.”). 
 199 Id. at 326. 
 200 United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 19392/92, 
Judgment of 30 Jan. 1998, available at http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/CaseLaw/hof.nsf/0/34e0674b5f 
3434c6c1256640004c3741. 
 201 Gökay, supra note 162, at 326; United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 
1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
 202 Gökay, supra note 162, at 326. 
 203 See Kurdish Spoken in Challenge to Turkey: Politician Violates Law that Bars the 
Language in Official Places, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 24, 2009, available at http://www.msn 
bc.msn.com/id/29371366/#after (noting that “[t]he prime minister has himself spoken a few 
words in Kurdish at a campaign rally, but fears of national division prevent any concerted 
effort to repeal the laws”). 
 204 Turkey’s Constitutional Court Closes DTP, HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS (Dec. 11, 2009), http://  
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=constitutional-court-votes-to-xx-turkey-pro-kurdish-part- 
009-12-11 (quoting Turkish Constitutional Court President, Haşim Kılıç). 
 205 See supra Part III.C (setting forth reasoning that contemplates Article 27 protection of 
language as basic human right). 
2012] SPEAKING OF SECESSION  581 
advancement in the recognition of Kurdish language use, there is some 
qualification that makes the linguistic right gained equivocal in the shadow 
of constitutionally ordained Turkish linguistic dominance.  It is this endemic 
failure of the domestic political process, combined with a prevalent history 
of language oppression, that gives rise to a well-supported claim of linguistic 
secession. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The “Kurdish question,” as it pertains to linguistic rights, is the archetypal 
question that was meant to be settled through remedial secession, or, in the 
case of linguistic oppression, linguistic secession.  As exemplified by the 
Kurdish situation in Turkey, this claim of linguistic secession involves the 
following fact pattern: 
First, there must be a linguistic group that constitutes both a “people” and a 
“minority.”  That is, there must exist a people, large enough and sufficiently 
connected culturally and linguistically to be identifiable, while fewer in 
number than the total state population and linguistically distinct to be 
considered a linguistic minority.  This satisfies the basic self-determination 
requirement that only a people may self-determine and also gives the 
heightened linguistic minority protections of Article 27 of the ICCPR. 
Second, the linguistic group must be concentrated in a particular section 
of the state.  This requirement gives deference to the doctrine of uti 
possidetis that a secessionist claim will not involve reaching past the 
boundaries of the host state in the event of secession. 
Third, there must be a deliberate, historically pervasive, and unrelenting 
state practice of linguistic rights infringement that violates Article 27 of the 
ICCPR.  Secession is not favorably looked upon in the international 
community, which places a great emphasis on domestic resolution of human 
rights issues.  But this emphasis on state sovereignty is not absolute.  Where 
there is a historic and unceasing state practice to oppress the language of the 
linguistic group, there is strong evidence that the presumption of state 
sovereignty should be forfeited and an international law claim of secession 
based on systematic human rights oppression should be placed in the hands 
of the linguistic group as a check on the politics of the host state. 
The Kurds in Turkey are not the lone victims of a state’s use of official 
language provisions to undermine linguistic rights.  Considering the vast 
linguistic diversity of North Africa, Anatolia, the Levant and Mesopotamia, 
and the Persian Gulf, it is shocking to find that only three languages dominate 
the public sphere: Arabic, Persian, and Turkish.206  In France, where the 
                                                                                                                   
 206 Lewis, supra note 158, at 37. 
582  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:555 
Basque continue their secessionist movement, the Toubon law207 imposes the 
use of heavily regulated French in six areas of public life: consumer 
information; employment; education; demonstrations, colloquiums, and 
congregations; audiovisual media; and civil service.208  In addition to public 
imposition of French, French citizenship requires “societal and cultural 
assimilation,”209 appearing to mandate that one forsake one’s way of life, 
including one’s language.  In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of 
China (XUAR), where there is an active secessionist movement, the Uyghur 
government has made Uyghur the official language of the XUAR since 
1955.210  However, the Chinese government continues to regulate the use of 
Uyghur, alternating between mandating and restricting the use of Uyghur’s 
native Arabic script in the areas covered by the ICCPR: media; education; 
business and trade; government access and the legal system; and culture and 
the arts.211  Finally, there is budding international support for the theory that 
language rights do not only apply to “certain indigenous, territorially anchored 
minority communities,” but extend to immigrant speakers of nonofficial 
languages.212  Such a theory of transnationalism may lead to sufficiently large 
immigrant communities otherwise satisfying the linguistic secession criteria 
outlined above to their own secessionist claim. 
A theory of linguistic secession is far from being supported 
internationally.  Arguably, the theory exacerbates all the minimalists’ reasons 
for not recognizing self-determination, let alone secession.  The most glaring 
fear is creating a “land for every language,” namely that the theory would 
permit international fragmentation on a scale comparable to the thousands of 
minority languages that exist. 
However, there are sufficient safeguards in the theory against giving 
every language its own country.  First, a linguistic secessionist claim must 
belong to a people sufficiently populous and concentrated in a particular state 
to be identifiable as a potential country.  Since 90% of the world’s 
population speaks the 100 most-used languages,213 it is not likely that the 
other thousands of languages will be sufficiently concentrated and numerous 
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to meet the standard required of a linguistic secessionist claim.  Second, 
unlike genocide, which is always a crime,214 having an official language and 
exercising language regulation are permitted under international law.215  This 
implies that for domestic means to be shut off to give rise to a secessionist 
alternative, there must be a systematic history of language oppression aimed 
at linguistic minority assimilation. 
Though there are many politically practical realities that might give a 
linguistic minority strong reasons not to secede, a claim of linguistic 
secession puts a powerful bargaining chip in the hands of linguistic 
minorities to negotiate for greater protection of their linguistic rights, 
especially in the area of official language.  As seen with the Kurds in Turkey, 
although the Democratic Initiative appears to have foundered, the initiative 
was a reaction to the active secessionist claim partly built on the 
infringement of Kurdish language rights.  Thus the theory of linguistic 
secession empowers linguistic minorities with the right to turn to doctrines of 
international law when their host states fail to adhere to ICCPR Article 27 
protection in the name of preserving majority, official languages. 
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